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Disruption	and	Deniable	Interventionism:	Explaining	the	Appeal	of	Covert	Action	and	
Special	Forces	in	Contemporary	British	Policy	
	
Rory	Cormac,	University	of	Nottingham	
	
The	 United	 Kingdom	 has	 long	 engaged	 in	 covert	 action.	 It	 continues	 to	 do	 so	
today.	 Owing	 to	 the	 secrecy	 involved,	 however,	 such	 activity	 has	 consistently	
been	 excluded	 from	 debates	 about	 Britain’s	 global	 role,	 foreign	 and	 security	
policy,	 and	military	 planning:	 an	 important	 lacuna	 given	 the	 controversy,	 risk,	
appeal,	and	 frequency	of	 covert	action.	Examining	when,	how,	and	why	covert	
action	is	used,	this	article	argues	that	contemporary	covert	action	has	emerged	
from,	and	 is	 shaped	by,	a	 specific	 context.	 First,	a	gap	exists	between	Britain’s	
perceived	 global	 responsibilities	 and	 its	 actual	 capabilities;	 policy	 elites	 see	
covert	 action	 as	 able	 to	 resolve,	 or	 at	 least	 conceal,	 this.	 Second,	 intelligence	
agencies	 can	 shape	 events	 proactively,	 especially	 at	 the	 tactical	 level,	 whilst	
flexible	 preventative	 operations	 are	 deemed	 well-suited	 to	 the	 range	 of	 fluid	
threats	currently	faced.	Third,	existing	Whitehall	machinery	makes	covert	action	
viable.	However,	current	covert	action	is	smaller	scale	and	less	provocative	today	
than	 in	 the	early	Cold	War;	 it	 revolves	around	“disruption”	operations.	Despite	
being	 absent	 from	 the	 accompanying	 debates,	 this	 role	was	 recognised	 in	 the	
2015	Strategic	Defence	and	Security	Review,	which	placed	intelligence	actors	at	
the	heart	of	British	thinking.	
	
	
2	
	
Britain	has	long	engaged	in	covert	action;	the	interference	in	the	affairs	of	another	state	or	
non-state	 actor	 in	 a	 detectable	 but	 plausibly	 deniable	 manner.	 The	 late	 1940s	 saw	
operations	 to	 “liberate”	Albania.	 In	 the	 1950s,	 attention	 turned	 to	 ambitious	 attempts	 at	
regime	change	in	Iran,	Egypt	and	Syria.	Over	the	following	decade,	covert	action	extended	
to	 supporting	 rebels	 in	 the	 Yemeni	 civil	 war	 and	 disrupting	 Indonesian	 forces	 during	
Confrontation.	The	1970s	 saw	a	 slight	dip	but	did	 include	covert	action	closer	 to	home	 in	
Northern	 Ireland	 –	 as	 well	 as	 a	 continuation	 on	 distant	 shores,	 this	 time	 intervening	 in	
Oman.	 Under	 Margaret	 Thatcher	 in	 the	 1980s,	 covert	 action	 increased	 with	 operations	
supporting	the	Afghan	Mujahedeen	against	the	Soviets.	Another	dip	occurred	in	the	1990s,	
but	 the	 Secret	 Intelligence	 Service	 (SIS,	 or	more	 commonly	 known	 as	MI6)	 still	 sought	 to	
disrupt	 the	proliferation	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction	covertly.	This	continued	 into	 the	
2000s,	alongside	a	renewed	emphasis	on	propaganda	and	Special	Forces	as	part	of	the	so-
called	War	on	Terror.
1
		
	 Covert	action	has	continued	since	2010.	Examples	include	activity	against	Muammar	
Gadaffi	 during	 the	 Libyan	 civil	war,	 operations	 to	 disrupt	 the	 Iranian	 nuclear	 programme,	
cyber	 operations	 against	 terrorists	 and	 organised	 criminals,	 and	 efforts	 to	 discredit	
Argentina	 through	 circulating	 false	 propaganda	 and	 implanting	 computer	 viruses.
2
	
Meanwhile,	David	Cameron	sanctioned	the	use	of	Special	Forces	 in	Libya,	 Iraq	and	Syria	–	
and	was	 keen	 to	 use	 them	 in	 Algeria	 and	Mali	 too.	 Through	 official	 documents,	 whistle-
blowers,	press	 reports,	 and	 interviews	–	and	a	 rigorous	methodological	process	of	 source	
triangulation	 –	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 move	 beyond	 the	 realms	 of	 speculation	 and	 uncover	 a	
surprising	amount	of	detail	on	such	activity.		
Nonetheless,	 scholarship	 on	 covert	 action	 inevitably	 suffers,	 owing	 to	 intense	
secrecy,	 from	 greater	 epistemological	 fragility,	 or	 uncertainty	 around	 what	 we	 can	 and	
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cannot	know,	than	studies	of	other	means	of	policy	execution.	E.H.	Carr	famously	wrote	that	
history	‘has	been	called	an	enormous	jig-saw	with	a	lot	of	missing	parts’;
3
	but	when	it	comes	
to	covert	action,	scholars	have	to	deal	with	misleading,	as	well	as	plenty	of	missing,	pieces	
whilst	 simultaneously	 lacking	an	overall	picture	 to	guide	 their	efforts.	 It	 is	a	world,	 to	use	
Donald	Rumsfeld’s	famous,	if	clumsy,	phrase,	of	known	unknowns	and	unknown	unknowns.	
Covert	action	scholarship,	also	suffers	an	evidence	bias.	Paramilitary-type	special	operations	
often	receive	the	most	press	and	parliamentary	attention	–	unsurprising	given	that	they	are	
among	 the	more	 tangible	 and	 dramatic	 forms	 of	 deniable	 interventionism.	However,	 this	
bias	 belies	 a	 range	 of	 nebulous	 and	more	 subtle	 covert	 action	 existing	 further	 below	 the	
radar.
4
		
Importantly,	 such	 issues	 do	 not	 mean	 that	 covert	 action	 should	 automatically	 be	
excluded	from	academic	inquiry.	Far	from	it:	the	inherent	controversy,	frequency,	risk,	and	
appeal	of	covert	action	make	it	too	important	to	ignore.	Guided	by	the	available	evidence,	
this	article	perhaps	inevitably	focuses	on	paramilitary-type	special	operations	–	although	it	
does	 discuss	 covert	 propaganda,	 technical,	 and	 influence	 operations	 in	 detail	 where	
possible.	However,	this	should	not	be	taken	to	imply	that	Special	Forces	activity	necessarily	
outweighs	less	tangible	operations.	
Interrogating	when,	 how,	 and	why	 Britain	 has	 used	 covert	 action	 since	 2010,	 this	
article	 argues	 that	 contemporary	 covert	 action	 has	 emerged	 from,	 and	 is	 shaped	 by,	 a	
specific	context.	After	revealing	British	understandings	for	the	first	time,
5
	it	highlights	three	
areas	–	ideational,	functional,	and	bureaucratic	–	that	enable	covert	action	to	flourish.	First,	
the	United	Kingdom	seeks	to	maintain	a	global	 role	–	a	powerful	 idea	 long	driving	 foreign	
policy	 –	 but	 is	 constrained	by	 economic,	military,	 and	 political	 factors.	 This	 creates	 a	 gap	
between	 perceived	 responsibilities	 and	 actual	 capabilities	 (or	 a	 responsibility/capability	
4	
	
disconnect).	Intelligence	and	Special	Forces	actors	have	long	been	seen	as	a	useful	means	of	
resolving	 this	 divide	 between	 ideational	 constructions	 of	 the	 global	 role	 and	 the	material	
reality	of	decline.	As	constraints	 increase,	 the	disconnect	 remains	 in	place	 today	–	 leaving	
covert	 action	 an	 appealing	 option.	 However,	with	 the	 (rare)	 exception	 of	 the	 Intelligence	
and	 Security	 Committee,	 senior	 politicians	 do	 not	 publicly	 refer	 to	 covert	 action.	 By	
identifying	and	unpacking	their	language,	and	the	assumptions	therein,	discourse	analysis	of	
statements	 and	 documents	 can	 be	 useful	 in	 demonstrating	 this	 appeal.	 Key	 language,	 or	
textual	markers,	 includes	using	 intelligence	actors	 to	 ‘disrupt’,	 ‘influence’,	 ‘project	power’,	
etc.
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Second,	 and	 functionally,	 intelligence	 actors	 play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 international	
relations.	Increasingly	in	confluence	with	Special	Forces,	they	engage	in	disruptive	action	to	
prevent	or	“fix”	threats.	This	is	driven	by	the	environment	in	which	they	are	now	operating,	
the	threats	they	are	facing,	and	moves	towards	 ‘fusion’	or	 ‘jointery’	within	British	security	
planning.	 Third,	 the	 domestic	 bureaucratic	 environment	 is	 conducive	 to	 covert	 action:	
legislation	 permits	 such	 activity;	 fora	 exist	 to	 task	 and	 coordinate	 covert	 action;	 whilst	
questions	 remain	 over	 the	 strength	 of	 ex	 post	 facto	 oversight.	 This	 article	 highlights	 the	
relationship	between	internal	and	external,	and	ideational	and	material	factors	in	British	use	
of	covert	action.
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Importantly,	 it	argues	 that	 contemporary	 trends	 in	covert	action	consist	of	 smaller	
scale,	 tactical,	 and	disruptive	operations.	Available	evidence	suggests	 that	 covert	action	 is	
not	 seeing	 a	 return	 to	 ambitious	 coups	 and	 regime	 change	 activity	 which,	 as	 a	 point	 of	
comparison,	 existed	 during	 the	 early	 Cold	 War	 and	 the	 era	 of	 decolonisation.	 British	
involvement	 in	 attempts	 (some	 more	 successful	 than	 others)	 to	 install	 new	 leaders	 in	
Albania,	 Iran,	 Egypt,	 Syria,	 Indonesia,	 and	 Oman	 is	 a	 thing	 of	 the	 past.	 In	 fact,	 sceptics	
5	
	
believe	 that	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 provides	 a	 less	 permissive	 environment	 for	 covert	
action	 altogether	 than	 during	 the	 Cold	War.
8
	 This	 article	 challenges	 such	 assumptions	 by	
arguing	 that,	 whilst	 the	 current	 environment	 may	 be	 less	 permissive	 for	 ambitious	
operations,	 it	 is	actually	more	permissive	 for	disruption	and	“fixing”.	This	article	contends	
that,	 rightly	 or	 wrongly,	 policymakers	 are	 turning	 to	 the	 covert	 toolkit,	 especially	 at	 the	
tactical	 level,	 to	 meet	 contemporary	 security	 challenges.
9
	 Indeed,	 rather	 than	 taking	 a	
normative	stance	by	critiquing	the	effectiveness	or	legitimacy	of	covert	action	in	detail,	this	
article	 seeks	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 “a	 missing	 dimension”	 of	 British	 policy	 and	 explain	 its	
contemporary	appeal	 sometimes	 regardless	of	debates	over	operational	efficacy	 (which	 is	
notoriously	difficult	to	judge)	altogether.	
Perhaps	 unsurprisingly	 given	 the	 surrounding	 secrecy,	 current	 debates	 about	
Britain’s	foreign	and	defence	policy	have	consistently	overlooked	the	issue	of	covert	action.	
This	is	important;	for	it	means	that	an	often	controversial	means	of	interventionism	is	going	
unacknowledged	 and	 facing	 little	 discussion	 from	 academics,	 commentators,	 and	
policymakers.	Trends	in	recent	defence	literature	acknowledge	that	flexibility	is	crucial	in	an	
uncertain	 international	 environment,
10
	 that	 the	 defence	 community	 is	 moving	 towards	
“jointery”	and	 integrated	 full-spectrum	capabilities,
11
	 and	 that	 the	2010	Strategic	Defence	
and	Security	Review	(SDSR)	amounted	to	a	missed	opportunity	to	offer	a	coherent	approach	
bringing	 ‘together	 ends,	 ways,	 and	 means.’
12
	 However,	 the	 literature	 stops	 short	 of	
considering	 the	 role	 of	 covert	 action	 –	 despite	 its	 clear	 relevance	 –	 within	 this.	 Debates	
around	current	British	capabilities	and	policy,	whilst	acknowledging	a	‘strategic	deficit’	and	
the	need	for	‘other	instruments	of	national	power’,	rarely	consider	deniable	interventions;
13
	
and	 this	 is	 despite	 the	 literature	 recognising	 the	 longstanding	 ‘predisposition	 of	 British	
defence	officials	to	seek	panaceas	to	age-old	problems.’
14
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Special	 Forces	 have	 attracted	 some	 academic	 attention;	 with	 scholars	 recognising	
their	 growing	 role	 in	 countering	 contemporary	 –	 especially	 asymmetric	 or	 irregular	 –	
threats.
15
	Much	of	this,	however,	is	disconnected	from	the	aforementioned	debates:	it	has	
been	 either	 from	 a	 specifically	 American	 perspective	 (which	 separates	 military	 special	
operations	 from	 covert	 action),
16
	 or	 from	 a	 strategic	 studies	 perspective	 (which	 isolates	
Special	Forces	from	intelligence,	examining	them	instead	in	relation	to	conventional	forces,	
and	 which	 focuses	 predominantly	 on	 their	 specific	 military	 value).
17
	 Meanwhile,	 those	
writing	about	defence	and	decline	overlook	the	potential	of	intelligence	and	Special	Forces	
as	a	force	multiplier.
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Building	 on	 such	 recent	 scholarship,	 this	 article	 adopts	 a	 holistic	 approach	 by	
considering	the	role	of	Special	Forces	and	intelligence	together	and	arguing	that	such	fusion,	
consistent	with	British	understandings	of	covert	action,	is	seen	by	elites	as	a	useful	means	of	
executing	 policy.	 This	 article	 resonates	widely	 beyond	 intelligence	 scholars	 and	 speaks	 to	
broader	debates	surrounding	contemporary	foreign	and	defence	policy,	as	well	as	Britain’s	
global	role.		
	
Defining	British	Covert	Action	
	
Although	the	phrase	is	usually	seen	as	an	Americanism,	British	officials	have	used	the	term	
“covert	action”	since	1945.
19
	More	recently,	 the	 Intelligence	and	Security	Committee	 (ISC)	
has	recognised	both	the	importance	of	‘covert	action’	against	terrorism	and	the	need	for	SIS	
to	strengthen	its	‘covert	action	capability’.
20
	Government	Communications	Headquarters,	or	
GCHQ,	 Britain’s	 signals	 intelligence	 agency,	 now	 talks	 of	 ‘online	 covert	 action’.
21
	
Nonetheless,	covert	action	is	among	the	most	secret	of	all	state	activities	and	no	(available)	
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official	 British	 definition	 exists.	 The	 only	 one	 accessible	 is	 that	 used	 by	 the	 military:	
operations	 ‘which	 are	 so	 planned	 and	 executed	 as	 to	 conceal	 the	 identity	 of,	 or	 permit	
plausible	denial	by,	the	sponsor.	They	differ	from	clandestine	operations	in	that	emphasis	is	
placed	on	 concealment	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 sponsor	 rather	 than	on	 concealment	 of	 the	
operation:	ie	disguised	but	not	concealed.’
22
	
	The	 closest	 Britain	 has	 to	 an	 American-style	 “such	 other	 functions	 and	 duties”	
statement	 is	 found	 in	the	1994	 Intelligence	Services	Act,	which	placed	SIS	and	GCHQ	on	a	
statutory	 footing.	 It	 permitted	 SIS	 to	 engage	 in	 ‘other	 tasks’	 outside	 of	 obtaining	
information.	 Unfortunately	 however,	 the	 UK	 lacks	 a	 clear	 conceptual	 framework	 beyond	
this.	 Since	 the	 Second	World	War,	Whitehall’s	 terminology	 has	 variously	 included	 special	
operations,	 special	 political	 action,	 counter-subversion,	 deniable	 action,	 and	 disruptive	
action.	All	of	these	were	slightly	different	and	reflect	the	broad	spectrum	of	covert	action.	
To	complicate	matters	further,	policymakers	rarely	speak	of	covert	action	directly,	but	refer	
instead	to	its	component	parts,	means,	or	goals.	Linguistic	markers	present	in	government	
discourse	 include	 disrupt,	 influence,	 prevent,	 shape,	 and	 discredit:	 i.e.	 when	 intelligence	
agencies	affect	change	themselves.	Tactics	for	deniable	interventionism	are	many;	and	this	
article	considers	them	together.	Generally	speaking,	the	British	have	long	thought	of	covert	
action	 in	 two	 categories:	 propaganda	 (including	 both	 grey	 and	 black)
23
	 and	 operations	
(encompassing	 political,	 economic,	 and	 special).	 Compared	 to	 the	 Americans,	 the	 UK	 has	
traditionally	placed	far	less	focus	on	paramilitary	activities.		
The	British	approach	has	been	comparatively	decentralised.	From	the	1960s,	SIS	or	
‘other	departments’	took	charge	of	‘deniable’	operations,	which	amounted	to	those	where	
‘in	spite	of	the	probability	that	H.M.G.	connived	its	execution	and	in	spite	of	some	tenable	
arguable	evidence	that	H.M.G.	was	officially	involved,	H.M.G.	considers	it	politically	feasible	
8	
	
to	deny	complicity	in	public	statements.’
24
	“Other	departments”	was	a	reference	to	growing	
Ministry	 of	 Defence	 (which	 oversaw	 both	 Special	 Forces	 and	 deception)	 involvement	 in	
covert	activity.	Indeed,	since	the	late	1950s,	covert	action	has	seen	closer	relations	between	
the	military	and	SIS.	This,	as	we	shall	see,	is	still	felt	keenly	today.		
The	 American	 system	 has	 tried	 to	 define	 and	 strictly	 delineate	 covert	 action	 and	
Special	Forces.	A	deniable	operation	is	a	covert	action	(requiring	a	presidential	finding	and	
notification	of	congressional	oversight	committees)	when	it	does	not	take	place	in	a	military	
–	or	anticipated	military	–	environment.
25
	By	 contrast,	 the	UK	context,	which	 is	 free	 from	
the	 thicket	 of	 rules	 and	 regulations	 engulfing	Washington	 after	myriad	 scandals	 over	 the	
past	60	years,	allows	policymakers	to	use	national	assets	more	freely	as	they	see	fit.
26
	As	a	
result,	 and	 given	 that	 SIS	 lacks	 a	 paramilitary	 capability	 and	 operates	 closely	 with	 the	
military,	the	line	is	particularly	blurred.	Back	in	the	1980s	British	understandings	of	Special	
Forces	encompassed	covert	action,
27
	and	the	Army	today	refers	to	‘shaping	operations	[…]	
through	 covert	 action	 by	 special	 units.’
28
	 Combined	with	 recent	moves	 towards	 fusion	 of	
intelligence	 and	 Special	 Forces	 capabilities,
29
	 this	 article	 therefore	 considers	 both	 covert	
action	and	Special	 Forces	 together.	Whilst	 acknowledging	 the	 conceptual	differences,	 it	 is	
primarily	 focussed	 on	 deniable	 interventionism.	 Finally,	 and	 further	 illustrating	
decentralisation,	GCHQ	also	now	plays	a	large	role	in	British	covert	action	capabilities	too.	In	
the	British	tradition,	covert	action,	given	its	breadth	and	decentralised	nature,	is	understood	
by	means	rather	than	actor.	The	skills	of	these	various	actors	form	an	increasingly	appealing	
toolkit	for	policymakers,	for	reasons	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
	
The	Ideational:	Concealing	the	Responsibility/Capability	Disconnect	
	
9	
	
Policy	elites	perceive	Britain	as	a	global	player	and	intend	to	maintain	global	influence.	The	
2015	SDSR	proudly	and	unambiguously	 stated:	 ‘Our	vision	 is	 for	a	secure	and	prosperous	
United	Kingdom,	with	global	reach	and	influence.’
30
	And	this	was	not	a	one	off.	Earlier	 in	
the	year,	Cameron	defiantly	stated:	‘Anyone	who	feels	that	Britain	is	somehow	shrinking	its	
role	 in	 the	world;	 that's	 not	 the	 case.’
31
	 In	 2014,	 90	 per	 cent	 of	Members	 of	 Parliament	
approvingly	 agreed	 that	 Britain	 punches	 above	 its	 weight	 globally,
32
	 whilst	 the	 2010	
National	 Security	 Strategy	 (NSS)	 proclaimed:	 ‘We	 should	 be	 under	 no	 illusion	 that	 our	
national	interest	requires	our	continued	full	and	active	engagement	in	world	affairs’.
33
		
In	what	perhaps	can	be	termed	UK	exceptionalism,	Britain	has	consistently	sought	to	
operate	with	a	heightened	sense	of	responsibility.
34
	This,	as	Croft	et	al	have	pointed	out,	has	
long	been	an	influential	idea	determining	policy	‘irrespective	of	resource	constraints.’
35
	The	
global	 role	 largely	 manifests	 itself	 in	 an	 ability	 to	 maintain	 international	 order,	 project	
influence,	and	promote	British	values	overseas.	The	role	is	not	lost	on	key	allies.	American	
government	officials	have	implored	the	UK	to	continue	its	global	role.	In	2015,	for	example,	
Defense	Secretary	Ashton	Carter	argued	that	 ‘it	would	be	a	great	 loss	 to	 the	world	 if	 [the	
UK]	now	took	action	that	would	indicate	disengagement’.
36
		
As	constructivist	scholars	have	argued,	the	way	in	which	policy	elites	perceived	their	
obligations	was	vital	to	the	way	Britain	constructed	its	policies.
37
	However,	Britain’s	ability	
to	 maintain	 a	 global	 role	 is	 severely	 hampered	 by	 various	 constraints,	 creating	 a	 gap	
between	 the	 perception	 or	 idea	 and	 the	 reality.	 The	 most	 prominent	 among	 these	 is	
perhaps	economics.	Indeed,	the	shadow	of	severe	austerity	has	loomed	heavily	over	recent	
security	reviews.
38
	The	2010	SDSR	emphasised	‘tough	choices	to	bring	the	defence	budget	
back	to	balance.’
39
	Five	years	later,	Michael	Fallon,	the	Defence	Secretary,	warned	the	2015	
version	 ‘will	 be,	 quite	 properly,	 aligned	with	 the	 spending	 review	because	defence,	 to	 be	
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deliverable,	has	to	be	affordable.’
40
	And	the	opening	lines	of	David	Cameron’s	foreword	did	
not	disappoint:	‘Our	national	security	depends	on	our	economic	security,	and	vice	versa.’
41
	
The	 2015	 autumn	 spending	 review	 involved	 a	 better-than-expected	 outcome	 for	 the	
Ministry	of	Defence,	but	by	this	point	austerity	had	had	a	severe	impact.	As	a	result	of	five	
years	of	cuts,	the	House	of	Commons	Defence	Select	Committee	concluded	that	Cameron’s	
government	 had	 halved	 Britain’s	 fighting	 power	 since	 2010.
42
	 Similar	 problems	 have	
hampered	 traditional	 diplomacy	 too.	 Between	 2010	 and	 2015,	 the	 Foreign	 and	
Commonwealth	Office	budget	fell	by	21%.
43
			
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 post	 9/11	 environment	 has	made	 assertive,	 confident,	 and	
overt	interventionism	much	more	difficult.	As	the	Chief	of	the	Defence	Staff	argues,	‘there	is	
no	 longer	 a	 simple	 distinction	 between	 war	 and	 peace.	We	 are	 in	 a	 state	 of	 permanent	
engagement	 in	a	global	 competition.’
44
	A	great	deal	has	been	written	about	 the	changing	
nature	of	warfare	and,	given	spatial	constraints,	it	is	impossible	to	discuss	this	in	detail.	Core	
themes,	recognising	its	growing	complexity,	include	blurring	boundaries	between	public	and	
private,	local	and	global;
45
	the	rise	of	proxy	warfare;
46
	and	the	burdens	of	victory.
47
	Each,	as	
the	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 recognises,	 has	 challenged	 Britain’s	 ability	 to	 project	 influence	
militarily.
48
		
Domestic	 political	 factors	 constrain	 the	overt	 pursuit	 of	 global	 responsibilities	 too.	
The	wars	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	severely	dented	public	support	for	future	interventions.
49
	
Even	the	then	Defence	Secretary,	Philip	Hammond,	admitted	in	2013	that	the	British	public	
were	war-weary	and	would	support	military	action	only	in	‘extreme	circumstances.’
50
	Such	
antipathy	 has	 developed	 alongside	 greater	 public	 cynicism	 towards	 politicians.	 In	 March	
2003	 (before	 accusations	 of	 “dodgy”	 dossiers	 and	 “sexing	 up”),	 63	 per	 cent	 of	 people	
trusted	Tony	Blair	on	Iraq.	By	2014,	54	per	cent	did	‘not	trust’	Cameron	at	all	when	debating	
11	
	
whether	 Britain	 should	 take	 military	 action.
51
	 Moreover,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 public	 now	
believe	 that	 the	 UK	 should	 only	 take	 military	 action	 if	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 votes	 to	
support	 it	 and	 politicians	 are	 ever	 less	 inclined	 to	 ignore	 public	 opinion	 ‘after	 the	 Iraq	
experience	 weighed	 so	 heavily	 on	 the	 legacy	 of	 Tony	 Blair’.
52
	 All	 of	 this	 creates	 a	 sharp	
constraint	 on	 overt	 interventionism	 as	 a	 means	 to	 maintain	 global	 influence,	 as	
demonstrated	by	Cameron’s	decision,	in	November	2015	before	the	Paris	terrorist	attacks,	
to	 back	 away	 from	 a	 proposed	 vote	 on	 airstrikes	 in	 Syria	 precisely	 because	 he	 feared	
losing.
53
		
Driven	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 Britain	 as	 a	world	 power,	 political	 elites	 desire	 a	 global	 role	
with	 global	 responsibilities.	 However,	 economic,	 military,	 and	 political	 factors	 seriously	
constrain	 traditional	 interventionism.	This	creates	a	gap	between	 ideational	construct	and	
material	 reality;	 between	 perceived	 responsibilities	 and	 actual	 capabilities.	 The	
responsibility/capability	 disconnect	 has	 not	 gone	 unnoticed.	 In	 2014,	 the	 parliamentary	
Joint	 Committee	 on	 the	 National	 Security	 Strategy	 expressed	 scepticism	 that	 the	 central	
aim,	 to	maintain	a	global	 role,	 could	be	achieved	 in	 light	of	 spending	cuts.	 It	warned	 that	
‘even	 during	 the	 lifespan	 of	 the	 current	 NSS,	 the	 UK’s	 international	 influence	 has	
fluctuated.’
54
		
This	is	not	a	new	problem.	Britain	has	long	been	in	decline,	yet	desired	a	global	role.	
Successive	governments	(of	all	colours)	have	continuously	turned	to	intelligence	and	Special	
Forces	 to	 shape	 events	 and	 perpetuate	 the	 global	 role	 idea	 though	 smoke,	 mirrors,	 and	
fancy	 footwork.	 Examination	 of	 the	 declassified	 historical	 record	 offers	 voluminous	
examples	of	governments,	from	Clement	Attlee	onwards,	resorting	to	covert	action	in	these	
circumstances.
55
	Despite	 its	 inherent	risks,	covert	action,	rightly	or	wrongly,	has	 long	been	
seen	as	a	potential	“silver	bullet”.
56
	Judging	the	effectiveness	of	covert	action	is	notoriously	
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difficult	and	lies	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article.
57
	What	is	important	here	is	that	regardless	
of	quantified	 success,	or	 in	 spite	of	apparent	 failures	and	 limitations,	British	governments	
have	consistently	turned	to	covert	action	–	it	often	proved	too	tempting	not	to.	Doing	so	is	a	
consequence	of	legitimising	the	great	power	discourse.	
Covert	action	can	and	does	bypass	economic	constraints.	Threats	may	be	a	constant	
in	 international	 relations	 but,	 as	 strategists	 such	 as	 Colin	 Gray	 argue,	 interventionism	 ‘is	
affected	all	 the	time	by	policy,	strategy,	and	resource	 limitations.’
58
	Like	 intelligence	more	
broadly,	covert	action	is	a	form	of	state	power,	analogous	to	economic	or	military	power.
59
	
It	 can	 also	 be	 a	 force	 multiplier	 allowing	 the	 execution	 of	 policy	 using	 fewer	 resources,	
fewer	 “boots	 on	 the	 ground”,	 and	 with	 fewer	 casualties.	 That	 the	 current	 government	
believes	 this	 is	 demonstrated	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 despite	 deep	 cuts	 elsewhere,	 both	
intelligence	 and	 Special	 Forces	 actors	 have	 consistently	 enjoyed	 investment	 ‘to	 increase	
their	 effectiveness	even	 further.’
60
	George	Osborne,	 the	Chancellor	of	 the	Exchequer,	has	
stated	 that	 British	 policy	 responses	 must	 adapt	 ‘as	 the	 nature	 of	 war,	 espionage	 and	
terrorism	 changes’,	 and	 that	 increased	 funding	 will	 allow	 intelligence	 to	 ‘help	 disrupt	
terrorist	 plots’.
61
	 For	 example,	 as	 discussed	 in	 detail	 below,	 GCHQ,	 one	 of	 the	 main	
beneficiaries	 of	 increased	 funding,	 has	 established	 a	 programme	 to	 do	 just	 that.	 Second,	
demonstrating	 force	multiplication,	 the	2015	SDSR	explicitly	 argued	 that	 agile	 intelligence	
and	 Special	 Forces	 actors	 allow	Britain	 to	 ‘project	 our	 power	 globally’	 to	 help	 secure	 the	
‘vision’	 of	 worldwide	 influence.
62
	 With	 neither	 Osborne	 nor	 the	 SDSR	 willing	 or	 able	 to	
explicitly	 refer	 to	 covert	action,	both	cases	offer	 textual	markers	alluding	 to	covert	action	
which,	 in	 times	of	 austerity,	 offers	 an	 apparently	 cost-effective	means	of	 playing	 a	 global	
role.	 It	 forms	 part	 of	 a	 climate	 pushing	 Britain	 towards	 covert	 action	 regardless	 of	
effectiveness.	
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Covert	action	seemingly	bypasses	certain	military	constraints	too.	When	intervention	
is	unavoidable,	the	Ministry	of	Defence	argues	that	‘actors	will	seek	to	distance	themselves	
by	use	of	proxy	 forces,	 cyber-attacks,	as	well	as	covert	and	clandestine	methods.’
63
	Other	
commentators	have	pointed	to	a	potential	 ‘globalisation	of	covert	action’.
64
	The	UK	 is	not	
immune	from	such	approaches.	As	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff	put	it,	‘all	the	instruments	of	
national	 power	 need	 constantly	 to	 be	 in	 play’	 for	 Britain	 to	 compete	 in	 the	 twenty-first	
century	global	environment.
65
	The	government	has	quietly	recognised	covert	action	as	such	
an	 instrument	 of	 national	 power	 and	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘investing	 in	 greater	
numbers	of	Special	 Forces’	as	well	 as	using	proxies.
66
	 This	has	been	put	 into	practice.	 For	
example,	attempting	to	bypass	the	problems	of	using	conventional	force	to	defeat	non-state	
actors	 and	 operating	 in	 more	 than	 one	 battlefield	 simultaneously,	 Cameron	 despatched	
Special	 Forces	 to	 Libya	 in	 December	 2015	 to	 tackle	 ISIS	 there,	 whilst	 air	 strikes	
simultaneously	targeted	Syria	and	Iraq.
67
	
That	 is	not	 to	 say	 that	 covert	action	 is	a	 suitable	alternative	 to	 large	 scale	military	
intervention.	 Given	 military	 constraints,	 policymakers	 are	 increasingly	 keen	 merely	 to	
manage	uncertainty,	disorder,	and	insecurity.	States,	according	to	Christopher	Coker,	prefer	
to	 ‘patch	up,	 shore	up	or	underpin’	using	 ‘a	 series	of	 short-term	measures.’
68
	 Indeed,	 the	
‘tectonic	 shifts	 in	 world	 politics’	 faced	 by	 the	 British	 government,	 particularly	 the	 Arab	
Spring	 and	 rise	 of	 ISIS,	 increased	 uncertainty	 and	 created	 a	more	 flexible	 and	 pragmatic	
approach.
69
	In	such	situations	certain	types	of	covert	action,	particularly	at	the	tactical	level,	
can	be	useful.	As	one	instrument	of	national	power,	they	can,	if	effectively	deployed,	work	
to	disrupt	and	prevent	threats	from	materialising	and,	as	discussed	in	the	next	section,	are	
perceived	 as	 able	 to	 obviate	 the	 later	 need	 for	military	 intervention.	 As	 a	 result,	military	
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leaders,	traditionally	sceptical	of	unconventional	forces,	especially	in	Britain,	have	begun	to	
perceive	apparent	or	potential	benefits.
70
	
Politically	 too,	 covert	 action	 provides	 an	 apparently	 convenient	 means	 of	
sidestepping	 constraints;	 offering	 a	 potential	 panacea	 despite	 the	 inherent	 risks	 or	
limitations.	Public	support	for	intervention	is	often	limited	to	intelligence	and	Special	Forces	
personnel	only;
71
	the	public	have	a	‘more	robust	attitude’	to	Special	Forces	casualties	than	
regular	 soldiers;
72
	 only	 a	 third	 of	 the	 public	 believe	 the	 use	 of	 Special	 Forces	 requires	
parliamentary	approval;
73
	and	the	 ‘dependency	on	 internationally	sanctioned	mandates’	 is	
‘less	than	absolute’	when	using	covert	action.
74
	As	far	back	as	Harold	Wilson’s	premiership,	
the	 government	backed	away	 from	parliamentary	 votes	on	 the	use	of	 force	 in	Vietnam	–	
and	relied	on	covert	support	for	the	Americans	 instead.	Following	suit,	Cameron	evaded	a	
vote	 on	 ISIS	 in	 Syria	 until	 after	 the	 2015	 Paris	 attacks,	 but,	 according	 to	 the	 American	
National	Security	Agency,	all	the	while	looked	‘to	the	UK	security	and	intelligence	agencies	
for	 recommended	 courses	 of	 action	 to	 influence	 the	 outcome	 in	 Syria’,	 including	 ‘online	
effects	operations’	through	GCHQ	–	in	other	words,	covert	action.
75
	
At	the	international	political	level,	political	elites	see	covert	action	as	bolstering	the	
Anglo-American	 relationship.	 British	 defence	 and	 security	 capabilities	 are	 seemingly	 of	
diminishing	value	to	US	policymakers	and	an	unequal	but	inevitable	military	partnership	can	
no	longer	be	assumed.
76
	Intelligence	is	an	exception	in	which	British	expertise	can	allow	the	
government	to	punch	above	its	weight.	For	example,	the	2010	SDSR	emphasised	the	need	
to	 ‘enhance	 the	 vital	 intelligence	 contribution	 to	 the	bilateral	 relationship’	 and	prioritised	
‘focus	on	areas	of	comparative	national	advantage	valued	by	key	allies,	especially	the	United	
States,	 such	 as	 our	 intelligence	 capabilities	 and	 highly	 capable	 elite	 forces’.
77
	 SIS,	 Special	
Forces,	and	GCHQ	are	three	areas	in	which	the	British	contribute	to	an	increasingly	unequal	
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alliance,	 and,	 just	 as	 Harold	Macmillan	 attempted	 in	 the	 late	 1950s,	 drive	 an	 element	 of	
interdependence	into	the	relationship.	
Covert	 action	 certainly	 has	 its	 weaknesses	 and	 limitations;	 not	 least	 including	
dangers	of	unintended	consequences,	mission	creep,	and	exposure.	Nonetheless,	it	forms	a	
seductive	means	to	resolve	–	or	at	 least	conceal	–	the	responsibility/capability	disconnect:	
to	try	to	realise	the	ideational	construct	of	a	global	role	in	the	face	of	growing	constraints.	
Military	and	political	leaders,	often	at	loggerheads,	now	agree	on	the	benefits	of	flexible	and	
deniable	interventionism.
78
	 It	 is	of	 little	surprise	therefore	that	successive	defence	reviews	
have	sought	to	enhance	Special	Forces	and	intelligence	capabilities,
79
	for	tasks,	as	we	shall	
see	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 often	 involving	 disruption	 operations.	 Indeed,	 the	 2015	 SDSR	
strongly	emphasised	the	preventative	and	disruptive	role	of	intelligence	and	Special	Forces	
throughout,	 placing	 it,	 as	 a	 force	 multiplier,	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 British	 thinking.	 Having	
established	the	 ideational	appeal	or	motivation,	 this	article	will	now	demonstrate	the	role	
covert	 action	 can	 potentially	 play	 and	 where	 it	 is	 deemed	 a	 useful	 alternative	 to	 overt	
interventionism.		
	
The	Functional:	Disruption,	Fusion	and	the	Rise	of	the	“Fixers”	
	
Intelligence	 actors,	 alongside	 Special	 Forces,	 attempt	 to	 fix	 or	 disrupt	 potential	 threats.	
Scholars,	 such	 as	Alastair	 Finlan,	 have	 long	 argued	 that	 changes	 in	 both	 the	 international	
environment	 and	 the	 British	 defence	 community	 have	made	 the	 future	 bright	 for	 Special	
Forces,	 and	 that	 they	will	 ‘continue	 to	 be	 the	 “force	of	 choice”	 for	 swift	 and	unorthodox	
state	 responses	 to	 perceived	 threats.’
80
	 Whilst	 true,	 this	 is	 only	 half	 the	 story.	 Charles	
Cogan,	a	former	senior	CIA	officer	turned	scholar,	has	persuasively	argued	that	‘intelligence	
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operatives	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 will	 become	 hunters	 not	 gatherers.	 They	 will	 not	
simply	sit	back	and	gather	information	that	comes	in,	analyse	it	and	then	decide	what	to	do	
about	it.’
81
		
A	desire	to	help	fill	the	gap	between	perceived	responsibilities	and	capabilities	has,	
in	part,	driven	this	active	turn;	so	too	has	the	nature	of	the	threats	and	the	climate	in	which	
they	 are	 faced.	 Both	 have	 caused	 a	 preference	 for	 pragmatic	 and	preventative	 disruptive	
action	designed	to	counter	threats	and	manage	uncertainty	at	source	–	before	they	escalate	
into	a	serious	problem.	Indeed,	the	security	establishment	has	long	recognised	the	dangers	
of	 insecurity	 and	 risk,	 often	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 a	 ‘unified,	 hegemonic	 national	 interest’.
82
	
Given	 that	 the	 ‘active	management’	 of	 risk	 involves	 averting	 speculative	 scenarios	 rather	
than	attaining	specific	outcomes,
83
	covert	action	potentially	offers	a	means	of	anticipatory	
self-defence	and	action	before	proof	of	harm.
84
	This	is	necessary,	for	example,	in	countering	
terrorism.	Rather	than	ambitiously	seeking	to	rebuild	nations,	it,	if	used	wisely,	offers	a	light	
footprint,	 obviates	 the	 burdens	 of	 victory,	 and	 disrupts	 hostile	 groups	 before	 they	 can	
attack.	 Like	 any	 means	 of	 policy	 execution,	 covert	 action	 also	 has	 limitations	 (both	
practically	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 democratic	 legitimacy)	 and	 must	 be	 properly	 managed	 and	
coordinated,
85
	but	the	appeal	in	the	current	international	climate	remains	strong.	
Disruption	is	not	especially	new,	but	has	been	overlooked	in	academic	literature	and	
policy	 debates	 because	 of	 secrecy.	 In	 fact,	 SIS	 has	 increasingly	 engaged	 in	 disruptive	
activities	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War,
86
	 whilst	 the	 ISC	 has	 consistently	 recognised	 the	
virtues	of	such	action.
87
	Disruption,	often	involving	a	fusion	of	 intelligence	and	operational	
functions,	has	been	integral	to	British	counter-terrorism	since	9/11.
88
	While	many	recognise	
the	 long-held	 role	 of	 Special	 Forces	 in	 flexible	 and	 direct	 action,
89
	 the	 Special	 Forces	
community	 has	 recently	 undergone	 a	 transformation	 towards	 flatter	 organisational	
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structures,	 towards	 influence	 (or	 less	 kinetic)	 operations,	 and,	 crucially,	 towards	 closer	
relations	 with	 intelligence	 actors.
90
	 This	 has	 been	 clearly	 demonstrated	 by	 recent	
organisational	reforms.	In	2007,	E	squadron	was	established	as	a	composite	force	of	Special	
Air	Service,	Special	Boat	Service	and	Special	Reconnaissance	Regiment	personnel	operating	
at	 the	 disposal	 of	 SIS	 and	 the	 Director	 of	 Special	 Forces.
91
	More	 recently,	 the	 Treasury’s	
2015	 Spending	 Review	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘fusing’	 intelligence	 with	 military	
actors	 to	 ‘disrupt’	 global	 threats,
92
	whilst	 a	 Joint	 Security	 Fund	was	 created	 to	 coordinate	
funding.
93
	
It	is	of	no	surprise	that	British	Special	Forces,	alongside	SIS,	adopted	a	central	role	in	
the	 so-called	 Global	 War	 on	 Terror	 and	 its	 aftermath,	 especially	 given	 the	 difficulties	
surrounding	military	or	diplomatic	responses	to	terrorism.
94
	Such	means	are	vital	given	‘the	
continued	 existence	 of	 a	 security	 environment	 that	 is	 dominated	 by	 irregular	 threats,	
transnational	 networks	 and	 sub-state	 groups.’
95
	 For	 example,	 Cameron	 has	 sanctioned	 a	
new	 ‘proactive’	 Special	 Forces	 approach	 to	 ISIS,	 apparently	 giving	 Special	 Forces	 ‘carte	
blanche’	 to	 launch	 raids	 inside	 Syria	 and	 Iraq,
96
	 alongside	 sending	 the	 SAS	 (and	 likely	 the	
SBS)	 to	 Libya	 to	 disrupt	 and	 prevent	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 ISIS	 headquarters	 there.
97
	
Alongside	 broader	 recognition	 of	 the	 disruptive	 role,	 the	 2015	 SDSR	 made	 it	 clear	 that	
Special	 Forces	 will	 ‘act	 decisively’	 where	 appropriate.
98
	 Similarly,	 the	 SIS	 website	 clearly	
acknowledges	the	agency’s	involvement	in	disrupting	terrorist	threats	overseas.
99
	
Here	it	is	possible	to	move	away	from	the	aforementioned	evidence	bias	in	favour	of	
Special	Forces	and	examine	propaganda,	influence,	and	technical	operations	as	well.	There	
is	more	to	British	covert	action	than	paramilitary	activity	and	GCHQ	disrupts	terrorist	targets	
too.	In	2012,	the	ISC	explicitly	called	for	an	increase	in	online	disruption	operations,	which	it	
defined	 as:	 ‘Accessing	 the	 networks	 or	 systems	 of	 others	 to	 hamper	 their	 activities	 or	
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capabilities	 without	 detection	 (or	 at	 least	 without	 attribution)’.
100
	 Much	 contemporary	
activity	revolves	around	technical	sabotage	and	a	range	of	tricks,	which,	as	one	insider	put	
it,	will	never	see	the	light	of	day.
101
	This	 is	some	of	Britain’s	most	secret	activity	–	but	it	 is	
possible	 to	 give	 clear	 examples:	 GCHQ	 has	 significantly	 disrupted	 Taleban	 operations	 in	
Afghanistan	 by	 blitzing	mobile	 phones	 with	 text	messages	 and	 calls	 every	 10	 seconds.
102
	
Current	 disruption	 and	 technical	 sabotage	 techniques	 also	 involve	 sending	 viruses	 and	
Denial	 of	 Service	 attacks	 (known	 as	 ROLLING	 THUNDER	 and	 PREDATORS	 FACE),	 whilst	
ANGRY	PIRATE	is	‘a	tool	that	will	permanently	disable	a	target’s	account	on	their	computer’.	
GCHQ	 is	 going	 on	 the	 offensive.	 Its	 staff	 talks	 of	 ‘active	 covert	 internet	 operations’,	
proactive	means	of	accessing	data,	and	using	this	‘to	make	something	happen	in	the	real	or	
cyber	world.’
103
		
GCHQ	 also	 engages	 in	 influence	 operations	 to	 disrupt	 and	 discredit	 targets.	 Policy	
elites	see	these	as	important:	the	ISC	requested	more	‘information	operations’	–	especially	
in	 the	 cyber	 realm;
104
	 the	Ministry	 of	 Defence	 recognises	 that	 ‘success	 in	 future	 conflict,	
especially	 against	 adaptive	 and	 agile	 adversaries,	will	 require	 a	 shift	 away	 from	kinetic	 to	
influence	activity;’
105
	and	the	Chief	of	Defence	Staff	has	pointed	to	a	‘significant	increase	in	
the	power	of	 a	 potent	narrative’.
106
	 Emphasising	 the	need	 to	win	 the	battle	 for	 ideology,	
David	Cameron	has	compared	the	fight	against	 ISIS	to	the	Cold	War,	 itself	a	high	point	for	
covert	action	and	underground	battles	over	 ideology,	 culture,	 and	media.
107
	 Psychological	
operations,	including	unattributable	propaganda,	are	therefore	important.		
With	a	long	history	of	unattributable	propaganda,	revolving	around	the	Information	
Research	 Department	 (IRD)	 between	 1948	 and	 1977,	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 continues	 to	
support	‘information	operations’	today.
108
	Meanwhile,	the	Home	Office	created	a	Research,	
Information	and	Communications	Unit	 in	2007	designed	to	‘generate	challenge	to	terrorist	
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ideology	and	the	claims	made	by	terrorist	groups’.
109
	Although	current	propaganda	activity	
is	 limited	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 clear	 message,
110
	 some	 similarities	 seemingly	 exist	 with	 the	 IRD	
especially	in	its	desire	to	discreetly	‘directly	challenge	terrorist	propaganda’	and	engage	in	a	
‘counter-narrative	campaign’.
111
		
GCHQ,	however,	can	discredit	a	 target	more	covertly.	For	example,	 it	 recommends	
‘writing	 a	 blog	 purporting	 to	 be	 one	 of	 their	 victims.’	 Another	 capability,	 codenamed	
CHANGELING,	 involves	 the	 ‘ability	 to	 spoof	 any	 email	 address	 and	 send	 email	 under	 that	
identity’.	GCHQ	can	also	change	a	 target’s	photos	on	a	 social	networking	 site	–	a	move	 it	
boasts	‘can	take	“paranoia”	to	a	whole	new	level.’	Other	ways	GCHQ	can	manipulate	targets	
in	order	to	disrupt	or	discredit	include	the	‘ability	to	artificially	increase	traffic	to	a	website’	
(GATEWAY),	 ‘to	 inflate	 page	 views	 on	 websites’	 (SLIPSTREAM),	 and	 to	 ‘change	 [the]	
outcome	of	online	polls’	 (UNDERPASS).
112
	As	noted	above,	 the	American	National	Security	
Agency	suggested	that	Cameron	has	long	turned	to	these	capabilities	in	Syria.
113
	
Driven	 by	 the	 need	 for	 preventative	 action	 (or	 the	 ‘active	 management’	 of	 risk),	
disruption	extends	beyond	counter-terrorism	to	other	contemporary	threats	too.	As	Richard	
Aldrich	argues,	a	globalised	world	has	 forced	governments	 to	 ‘place	 their	 intelligence	and	
security	 services	 in	 the	 front	 line	 against	 a	 range	 of	 elusive	 but	 troublesome	opponents,’	
again	 leading	 to	 a	 proactive	 intelligence	 community.
114
	 The	 proliferation	 of	 WMD,	 for	
example,	 requires	 preventative	 disruption,	 alongside	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 counter-
proliferation	 measures	 including	 law	 enforcement	 and	 multilateral	 activity.	 SIS	 has	 had	
success	 at	 this.	 John	 Sawers,	 its	 former	 Chief,	 admitted	 that	 SIS	 ran	 a	 series	 of	 covert	
operations	 to	 ‘slow	 down’	 Iranian	 development.
115
	 Similarly,	 the	 Butler	 Review	 into	
Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	hinted	at	SIS	action	to	disrupt	North	Korean	development	in	
the	1990s.
116
	The	same	can	be	said	 for	organised	crime,	against	which	GCHQ’s	 false	blogs	
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have	been	successful,
117
	as	well	as	risks	emanating	from	mass	migration.	Indeed,	Cameron	
has	 tasked	 intelligence	 personnel	 with	 disrupting	 human	 trafficking	 networks	 in	 the	
Mediterranean.
118
	 Again,	 this	 broadens	 our	 understanding	 of	 contemporary	 covert	 action	
beyond	the	constraints	of	the	evidence	bias	allowing	insight	into	other	sensitive	areas.	
Like	counter-terrorism,	in	all	these	cases	the	nature	of	the	threat,	rightly	or	wrongly,	
invites	covert	action.	Objective	assessments	of	efficacy	are	difficult,	and	covert	action	does	
have	inherent	weaknesses,	but	it	is	clear	that	policymakers	are	turning	to	such	operations.	
On	one	hand,	these	threats	are	difficult	to	counter	entirely	overtly.	On	the	other	hand,	they	
require	preventative	management.	The	aim	 is	 to	disrupt	or	 fix	a	potential	 threat	before	 it	
reaches	British	shores,	thereby	quietly	bypassing	constraints	against	overt	intervention	and	
even	preventing	the	responsibility/capability	disconnect	from	arising	in	the	first	place.	It	is	a	
potentially	 virtuous	 circle	 –	 and	 one	which	 appeals	 to	 policymakers.	 Although	 it	may	 yet	
prove	 ambitious,	 this	 was	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 2015	 SDSR	 which	 recognised	 that	
intelligence	 agencies	 are	 able	 to	 reduce	 ‘the	 likelihood	 of	 threats	 materialising’	 through	
disruptive	action.
119
		
Whilst	 encouraging	 a	 more	 active	 intelligence	 approach,	 the	 diffuse	 and	 elusive	
nature	 of	 these	 threats	 simultaneously	 constrains	 larger	 more	 ambitious	 covert	 actions.	
Historically,	 British	 covert	 action	 focused	 on	 elites:	 on	 kings,	 generals,	 tribal	 chiefs,	 and	
opposition	leaders.	This	is	now	out	of	date.	As	recent	international	events	have	highlighted	
and	 governments	 recognised,	 the	UK	 operates	 in	 a	 networked	world	 in	which	 traditional	
political	authority	carries	less	agency	than	fifty	years	ago.	In	an	era	of	mass	communication,	
social	movements,	and	grassroots	change,	there	are	more	variables	to	control	and	it	 is	 far	
harder	 to	 affect	 manageable	 change.
120
	 Again	 therefore,	 the	 available	 evidence	 suggests	
that	covert	action	 is	taking	place	at	the	tactical	 level	and	attempting	to	disrupt	or	prevent	
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threats	rather	than	 instigate	regime	change	or	engage	 in	 longer	term	activity.	This	applies	
not	only	to	militaristic	special	operations,	but	to	influence	and	technical	operations	too.	
Having	 demonstrated	 why	 policymakers	 perceive	 covert	 action	 as	 appealing,	 this	
article	will	now	argue	that	existing	Whitehall	structures	enable	covert	action	too.	
	
The	Bureaucratic:	A	Permissive	Climate	
	
Demonstrating	 the	 interplay	between	 internal	 and	external	 factors,	Whitehall	possesses	a	
climate	conducive	for	using	intelligence	and	Special	Forces	actors	to	shape	events.	Increased	
political	 and	 legal	 scrutiny	 does	 not	 necessarily	 prevent	 operations.	 It	 may	 well	 curtail	
ambitious	 operations,	 but	 it	 has	 less	 impact	 on	 disruption	 or	 discrediting,	 which	 are	 less	
risky	and	provocative.	This	is	because	‘other	tasks’	are	a	legally	avowed	function	of	SIS	and	
GCHQ,
121
	whilst	Section	Seven	of	the	Intelligence	and	Security	Act	(known	in	the	press	as	the	
“James	 Bond	 clause”)	 protects	 intelligence	 officers	 from	 prosecution	 for	 otherwise	 illegal	
actions	anywhere	in	the	world,	so	long	as	they	were	signed	off	by	the	Secretary	of	State.
122
	
Indeed,	much	to	civil	liberties	campaigners’	perpetual	disappointment,	the	1994	legislation	
was	 actually	 rather	 permissive.	 SIS	 and	 GCHQ	 now	 have	 less	 to	 fear	 from	 exposure	 and	
simply	have	to	show	that	their	covert	operations	were	proportionate	and	had	been	properly	
ratified.
123
	We	 have	 already	 seen	myriad	 examples	 under	 the	 first	 Cameron	 government,	
including	 in	March	 2011	when	William	Hague,	 as	 Foreign	 Secretary,	 approved	 SIS’s	 initial	
covert	 operation	 to	 aid	 the	 Libyan	 rebels.	 Even	 this	 public	 failure	 did	 not	 prevent	
subsequent	covert	action	in	that	country;
124
	again	demonstrating	how	the	climate	outlined	
here	is	perhaps	more	important	than	objective	or	rational	judgements	of	efficacy	in	pushing	
British	policymakers	towards	covert	action.		
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Covert	 action	 is	 permitted	 in	 the	 British	 system;	 and	 scrutiny	 does	 not	 equate	 to	
rejection.	 Most	 British	 covert	 action	 since	 1945	 has	 consistently	 been	 tied	 to	 the	 core	
executive	 –	 at	 the	 strategic	 level	 at	 the	 very	 least.	 Back	 in	 1950,	 Clement	 Attlee	 and	 his	
Foreign	 Secretary,	 Ernest	 Bevin,	 authorised	 a	 pattern	 of	 covert	 action	 behind	 the	 Iron	
Curtain.
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	 In	 the	 mid-1950s,	 Anthony	 Eden	 and	 Harold	 Macmillan	 authorised	 a	 general	
approach	to	covert	action	 in	 the	Middle	East	and	Southeast	Asia.
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	This	 remains	the	case	
today	 with	 David	 Cameron	 looking	 to	 intelligence	 actors	 to	 influence	 developments	 and	
supposedly	giving	Special	Forces	carte	blanche	against	ISIS.
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In	 2010,	 Cameron	 created	 the	 National	 Security	 Council,	 further	 enhancing	 the	
permissive	environment	for	covert	action.	 It	provides	a	mechanism	to	task,	scrutinise,	and	
coordinate	 such	 activity.	 It	 does	 so	 in	 three	ways.	 First,	 the	 NSC	 sits	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
Whitehall	 intelligence	and	security	world.	 It	drives	the	 intelligence	community’s	work	and,	
symptomatic	 of	 the	 growing	 centrality	 of	 intelligence	 over	 recent	 decades,	 offers	 an	
unparalleled	 interaction	 with	 policy.	 It	 institutionalises	 regular	 contact	 between	 senior	
policymakers	and	the	 intelligence	chiefs,	thereby	naturally	offering	a	useful	framework	for	
the	discussion	of	covert	action.	 Iain	Lobban,	 then	head	of	GCHQ,	believed	 that	 the	NSC	 is	
‘one	of	 the	best	 things	 this	 government	has	done’	 because	 it	 ‘takes	 the	 sentiment	 in	 the	
room	 and	 translates	 it	 into	 tasking	 for	 each	 organisation’.
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	 Institutionalised	 contact	
between	the	core	executive	and	the	heads	of	SIS	and	GCHQ	has	resulted	in	the	latter	being	
asked	 to	 disrupt,	 sabotage,	 or	 “fix”	 a	 certain	 problem.
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	 Two	 recent	 examples	 of	 this	
include	 Cameron’s	 instruction	 to	 intelligence	 and	 Special	 Forces	 to	 hunt	 down	 so-called	
“Jihadi	 John”,
130
	 and	SIS’s	bungled	attempt	 to	make	 contact	with	 Libyan	 rebels	which	 the	
Foreign	Secretary	blamed	on	‘pressure	from	ministers’	to	do	something.
131
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Second,	 there	 is	 historical	 precedent	 for	 this.	 The	 NSC	 machinery	 operates	 in	 a	
similar	way	to	a	string	of	earlier	interdepartmental	committees	tasked	with	scrutinising	and	
coordinating	 the	 role	 of	 covert	 action	 as	 part	 of	 broader	 (often	 anti-Communist	 or	 anti-
nationalist)	interventionism.	These	include	the	Official	Committee	on	Communism	Overseas	
(of	the	1950s)	and	the	Joint	Action	Committee	(created	in	the	1960s).
132
	 In	all	three	cases,	
Cabinet	Office	machinery	has	provided	a	forum	to	set	a	framework	for	covert	action	and	to	
task	the	intelligence	agencies.	Third,	it	is	difficult	to	thrive	in	Whitehall’s	Darwinian	jungle.	In	
order	 to	 do	 so,	 government	 bodies	 constantly	 seek	 to	 remove	 constraints	 on	 their	
performance,	 the	 most	 prominent	 of	 which	 are	 budgetary	 and	 personnel	 cuts.
133
	 It	 is	
entirely	 predictable	 that	 in	 an	 era	 of	 austerity,	 SIS	 would	 appeal	 to	 the	 Prime	Minister’s	
desire	for	action;	especially	when	operating	in	an	environment	where	they	are	regularly	in	
institutionalised	 contact.	 Closely	 attuned	 to	 policy	 needs	 and	 priorities,	 SIS	 now	 has	 a	
perfect	forum	for	event-shaping	operations.
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Evidence	of	this	is	already	emerging.	The	NSC	has,	for	example,	apparently	approved	
a	‘kill	list’	of	individuals	to	be	targeted	‘as	a	last	resort’.
135
	Before	then,	covert	action	in	Libya	
was	 overseen	 by	 the	 NSC	 machinery.	 This	 involved	 operations	 to	 develop	 the	 rebels’	
embryonic	ground	forces,	including	dispatching	an	advisory	team	and	building	up	a	longer-
term	train	and	equip	project.	The	National	Security	Council’s	sub-committee	on	Libya	met	
over	sixty	times	during	the	conflict	to	consider	both	strategic	and	tactical	matters	and	was	
accompanied	 by	 an	 official	 equivalent.	 Importantly,	 policymakers	 and	 intelligence	 chiefs	
debated	 the	 scope	 and	 possibilities	 of	 covert	 action	 around	 the	 NSC	 table.	 It	 provided	 a	
forum	 in	 which	 SIS,	 GCHQ,	 and	 Special	 Forces	 could	 be	 tasked.
136
	 Again	 however,	 it	
promoted	 tactical	 level,	 or	 short	 term,	 covert	 action,	 not	 least	 because	 real-time	
communications	 allow	 senior	 politicians	 to	 become	 more	 operationally	 involved.
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Moreover,	 regarding	 Special	 Forces	 at	 least,	 ‘short-term	 operational	 requirements	 have	
tended	to	trump	more	long-term’	alternatives.	A	more	ambitious	scale	leads	to	an	increase	
in	 personnel	 –	 and	 a	 decrease	 in	 quality.
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	 This	 inevitably	 prioritises	 the	 disruption	 and	
preventative	operations	outlined	above.	
At	the	same	time,	British	review	and	oversight	mechanisms	are	comparatively	weak.	
The	 ISC	 has	 long	 been	 criticised	 for	 being	 founded	 as	 a	 statutory	 ‘committee	 of	
parliamentarians’	 selected	 by,	 and	 reporting	 to,	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 rather	 than	 a	
parliamentary	committee.	Moreover,	it	traditionally	had	limited	powers	to	acquire	sensitive	
information,	 lacked	adequate	resources,	and	was	 initially	seen	as	overly	deferential	 to	the	
intelligence	agencies.
139
	Perhaps	most	 importantly	 regarding	covert	action,	 it	was	charged	
with	examining	policy,	rather	than	operational	or	‘individual	cases’.
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	After	all,	covert	action	
is	 not	 a	 policy.	 It	 is	 a	 means	 of	 executing	 policy.	 The	 2013	 Justice	 and	 Security	 Act	
strengthened	the	ISC	by	increasing	its	remit	over	operational	matters,	strengthening	some	
of	 its	 powers,	 and	 extending	 parliamentary	 control.	 Despite	 this,	 its	 monopoly	 over	
intelligence	 and	 the	 narrowness	 of	 its	 membership	 still	 prevents	 wider	 parliamentary	
scrutiny	and	oversight,	including	by	the	Foreign	Affairs	Select	Committee.	This	may	be	highly	
problematic	 from	 a	 normative	 or	 democratic	 perspective,	 but	 on	 a	 pragmatic	 level	 it	
increases	the	appeal	of	covert	action	to	the	executive.	
Select	committees	still	face	‘very	real	limits	with	regard	to	access	to	information	and	
personnel	 from	 the	 agencies	 and	 from	 government.’
141
	 In	 2014,	 the	 Home	 Affairs	 Select	
Committee	concluded	that	 ‘We	do	not	believe	the	current	system	of	oversight	 is	effective	
and	 we	 have	 concerns	 that	 the	 weak	 nature	 of	 that	 system	 has	 an	 impact	 upon	 the	
credibility	 of	 the	 agencies’	 accountability,	 and	 to	 the	 credibility	 of	 Parliament	 itself.’	MPs	
have	 compared	 the	 British	 system	 unfavourably	 to	 its	 American	 counterpart	 in	 which	
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congressional	committees	are	afforded	‘latitude	[…]	by	the	executive’	to	question	the	work	
of	intelligence	agencies.
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Aside	from	select	committee	statements,	evidence	of	this	weakness	can	be	found	in	
two	 other	 areas.	 First,	 ISC	 reports	 offer	 little	 discussion	 of	 covert	 action	 beyond	 an	
acknowledgement	 that	 it	 is	undertaken.	 The	only	exception	was	a	brief	paragraph	on	 the	
failure	in	Libya	which	merely	blamed	ministers	for	demanding	quick	action	and	praised	SIS’s	
ability	 to	 learn	 lessons.
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	 Second,	 the	 Americans	 appreciated	 Britain’s	 weak	 oversight	
system	when	 considering	 the	 UK’s	 value	 in	 the	 “special	 intelligence	 relationship”.
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	 This	
was,	 as	 the	 Snowden	 documents	 revealed,	 certainly	 the	 case	 regarding	 intelligence	
collection,	but	it	has	also	extended	to	covert	action.	The	CIA	valued	British	assistance	in	the	
covert	support	to	the	Mujahedeen	in	the	1980s	Afghan-Soviet	war,	for	example.	One	reason	
was	 because	 British	 legal	 restrictions	 were	 looser,	 especially	 compared	 to	 the	 post-
Watergate	 climate	 in	 which	 the	 CIA	 operated.
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	 Similarly,	 the	 American	 system	 of	
authorising	 covert	 action	 is	 more	 rigid	 than	 the	 British.	 Under	 the	 1991	 Intelligence	
Authorisation	Act,	Congress	must	be	informed	through	a	written	presidential	finding.	This	is	
not	the	case	in	the	UK.	There	is	a	difference	between	scrutiny	and	coordination	on	the	one	
hand	and	ex	post	facto	oversight	on	the	other.	The	latter	is	comparatively	weak,	giving	SIS	
room	to	manoeuvre;	but	the	former	 is	 reasonably	strong,	 thereby	ensuring	SIS	operations	
are	not	“rogue	elephants”	and	limited	to	disruptive	operations	less	likely	to	escalate.	
	 		
Conclusions	
	
The	United	Kingdom	engages	 in	covert	action.	The	available	evidence	suggests	 that	 this	 is	
generally	of	a	pragmatic,	small	scale,	and	disruptive	nature,	taking	place	predominantly	at	
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the	tactical	level.	The	context	from	which	this	is	emerging	is	important	in	so	far	as	it	shapes	
and	 enables	 such	 covert	 action.	 The	 idea	 of	 a	 global	 role	 remains	 a	 key	 driver	 of	 British	
policy,	 but	 the	 execution	 of	 this	 is	 hamstrung	 by	 economic,	 political,	 and	 military	
constraints.	 This	 creates	 a	 gap	 between	 perceived	 responsibilities	 and	 capabilities;	
ideational	 construct	 and	 material	 reality.	 Despite	 potential	 weakness	 and	 limitations	 of	
covert	action,	successive	governments	have	long	seen	it	as	a	means	of	resolving	this	and,	as	
constraints	intensify,	David	Cameron	is	following	suit.		
At	a	functional	level,	current	threats	necessitate	a	preventative	and	flexible	response	
designed	 to	 disrupt	 problems	 before	 they	 materialise.	 The	 past	 decade	 has	 witnessed	 a	
growing	 fusion	 between	 intelligence	 and	 Special	 Forces,	 as	well	 as	 intelligence	 personnel	
working	 proactively	 and	 operationally	 in	 their	 own	 right.	 At	 the	 bureaucratic	 level,	 and	
demonstrating	 interplay	between	 internal	and	external	 factors,	 the	domestic	machinery	 is	
conducive	 for	 such	 activity.	 SIS,	 GCHQ	 and	 Special	 Forces	 are	 permitted	 to	 engage	 in	
authorised	operations	overseas,	the	National	Security	Council	presents	a	powerful	forum	in	
which	 to	 task	 intelligence	 agencies,	whilst	 oversight	 is	 comparatively	weak.	 These	 factors	
combined	create	an	atmosphere	permissive	 to	 small	 scale,	 less	provocative	 covert	action,	
including	 disruption	 and	 discrediting	 operations.	 The	 fluidity	 of	 the	 international	
environment	and	greater	scrutiny	act	against	 longer-term	more	ambitious	activity.	 Indeed,	
the	 2015	 SDSR	 consistently	 recognised	 the	 importance	 of	 intelligence	 in	 ‘disrupting	
threats’.
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Covert	action	forms	a	broad	toolkit.	This	article	has	not	intended	to	suggest	that	all	
forms	will	be	applicable	 in	every	circumstance.	 It	 is	not	 the	case,	 for	example,	 that	online	
covert	action	will	plug	a	military	gap.	Instead,	this	article	has	contested	that	covert	action	is	
seen	as	both	allowing	the	maintenance	of	a	global	role	with	fewer	resources	and	capabilities	
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and	 (theoretically)	 preventing	 future	 threats	 from	 materialising,	 thereby	 preventing	 the	
need	 to	 face	 such	 constraints	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 It	 is	 not	 necessarily	 arguing	 that	 covert	
action	 will	 successfully	 achieve	 this.	 Indeed,	 covert	 action	 is	 a	 risky	 means	 of	 executing	
policy	 and	 involves	 a	 range	 of	 limitations,	 from	 “blowback”	 to	 escalation,	 and	 must	 be	
properly	 managed,	 coordinated,	 and	 integrated	 into	 overt	 policies.	 This	 article	 merely	
argues	that	covert	action	forms	an	attractive	 instrument	of	national	power	and	one	which	
merits	proper	consideration.	
The	evidence	is	already	beginning	to	mount.	Taken	together	it	is	persuasive.	But	it	is	
almost	entirely	absent	from	existing	public	debates.	Acknowledgement	in	academia	and	by	
government	 that	 the	UK	engages	 in	 this	 sort	of	activity	 is	only	a	 first	 step.	There	are	now	
debates	 to	be	had	on	 the	definitions	and	 framework	of	British	 covert	 action,	on	effective	
scrutiny	and	authorisation	processes,	on	effective	oversight	mechanisms,	on	the	strengths,	
weaknesses,	efficacy,	and	ethics	of	covert	action,	and	on	how	it	can	best	be	used	to	counter	
international	threats	such	as	terrorism	which	feature	so	heavily	in	current	policy.	
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